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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
ALLEN HALLSTROM and
JOHANNA C. HALLSTROM,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
vs.

L. M. BUHLER and
MONICA BUHLER, his wife,

Case No.
9730

Defendants-Appellants.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Statement of Facts as set out in the brief of
the defendant-appellant generally sets out the situation in this easel subject to some necessary corrections.
In 1956 one Glen Teeples sold to the defendantappellant a farm in Idaho on Uniform Real Estate
Contract. Subsequently/ in 19581 the defendant-appellant Buhler sold the farm on contract to William
Snyder and Irene Louise Snyder/ his wife/ by the
terms of which contract Snyder agreed to assume
all of the outstanding obligations against the property and agreed to pay Buhler $281641.80 for his
equity. However/ the payment to Buhler of such
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sums· included the real estate, as well. as the personal
property located thereon, as will be noted later in
this brief. There is some importance to be attached
to this fact. It is agreed that the contract required
payments on such equity to be made on the lst day
of December of each year, starting in 1959, at the
rate of $2,000.00 per year plus interest.
Paragraph two of the defendant-appellant's
Statement of Facts states in very carefully chosen
words that Buhler, the defendant-appellant, ''needed
funds and arranged to receive $14,371.88 from the
plaintiff Hallstrom". (Emphasis added.) As a matter
of fact, Buhler made contact with the Contract &
Mortgage Exchange, · which was an organization
existing at that time functioning, as the name would
imply, as a contract and mortgage exchange. Buhler contacted one Roland Funk, who was then the
president and general manager of Contract & Mortgage Exchange (Mr. Funk is now deceased) for
the sole purpose of selling his interest in the contract (in which he was the seller and Snyders were
the buyers) at a discount to some party for the purpose of obtaining immediate funds. Mr. Roland Funk
then contacted the plaintiff-respondent Hallstrom
herein to ascertain ·whether or not he would be
interested in buying the equitable interest of the
seller, Buhler, in the contract.
There was never, at any time, any mention made
or indicia of any kind, by Buhler, Hallstrom
or Roland Funk , that Hallstrom would be interested in or would make a loan to Buhler. As a
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matter of fact, all of the documents involved clearly
point out that Buhler assigned all of his right, title
and interest in and to the contract to Hallstrom. But
here, again, defendant-appellant has confused the
facts wherein they state that "Hallstrom admits that
only $19,938.86 of the contract equity was to pass."
The truth is that Hallstrom purchased, by agreement,
the contract involving the real estate, but not that
part of the contract, or the contract itself, in which
Buhler sold to Snyders the personal property. This
is important in that appellant Buhler would have the
Court believe that Hallstrom took only a portion of
the contract as some sort of security for a loan, which
is not true. Hallstrom did, in fact, purchase the real
estate contract on the farm in Idaho.
Factually, it is agreed that in addition to the
contract assigned by Buhler, Buhler agreed to guaranty that Snyder would perform under the BuhlerSnyder contract and, further, it is agreed that the
guaranty by Buhler to Hallstrom took the form of
and was secured by a mortgage which Buhler gave
Hallstrom on his home in Salt Lake City, Utah. The
mortgage unequivocally guaranteed that William
Snyder and Irene Louise Snyder, his wife, would
make the payments of the sums which would be
due and payable to mortgagees (Hallstrom) under
the said contract and assignment. There was no
recital or intent between the parties other than that
if Snyders did not pay the payments due under the
Buhler-Snyder contract, that Buhler would in fact
guaranty to do so and backed the guaranty by a
I!lortgage on his home in Salt Lake City. It is further
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agreed that the amount of the mortgage given to
guaranty Snyders' performance was $25,615.96,
which would be an amount equal to the face value
of the contract of the real property in Idaho at that
time, plus the interest which Snyders would be required to pay over a several year period.
A pretrial was held on January 10, 1962, and
judgment was awarded to Hallstrom as prayed, except that evidence was introduced at that time as to
money that Hallstrom had paid out in addition to
the $14,371.88, together with the money which he
had received in connection with the farm, and judgment was granted accordingly. Subsequent thereto,
at the request of Buhler's counsel who was then Mr.
Jack Darragh of Salt Lake City, Utah, in association
with a Mr. Duffin of the state of Idaho, and with the
consent of the Hallstrom's counsel, a second pretrial
was held for the purpose of clarifying the issues, at
which time Buhler introduced into evidence several
documents, including an affidavit sworn to by the
defendant Buhler purporting to present defendant's
case (R. 20-42). These documents were accepted into
evidence, and the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law and Decre·e were signed by the Court and filed
based thereupon. The motions were denied and on
April16, 1962, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
and Decree were entered in the case. On or about
April25, 1962, Buhler's present counsel filed a motion
to set aside Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Decree or, in the alternative, to amend them
(R. 84), and at that time and for the third time there
was presented to the pretrial judge all of the facts
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and all of the information as to how this matter arose
and the court was fully apprised thereof. Buhler's
counsel in his argument, again, for the third time,
presented to the pretrial court the situation most favorable to his client in light of the documents which
were then on record, and the motion was again denied, and from the judgment of the court defendantappellant Buhler makes this appeal.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRANSACTION WAS THE SALE. OF A CONTRACT EQUITY SECURED BY A MORTGAGE,
AND WAS NOT A LOAN.

Referring to Point I of the appellant, Buhler's
brief that the trial court did not frame an issue
whether the transaction was in fact a loan or a sale,
it is clear from the documents concerned in this matter that there was no question that this was not a
loan, was never intended to be a loan and that the
transaction was solely the sale of the equitable interest of Buhler in a Uniform Real Estate Contract
(R. 50). There is no promissory note involved herein,
and there is no agreement for return of said contract
upon any sum being paid to Hallstrom. Buhler had
no agreement or option to repurchase or reacquire
the contract fron1 Hallstrom. At the time Hallstrom
:purchased the contract, it was his intention to hold
the contract for investment purposes. Subsequent
events clearly point out that Hallstrom assumed all
the obliagtions incumbent upon an owner of real
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property, and was required, even after notice of the
default of Snyders to Buhler, to pay the mortgage
payments, pay the taxes, protect the water rights,
and do all and every act that a contract holder would
do.
At no time did the defendant-appellant ever
seriously contend tha.t this was a loan or that a loan
had been agreed upon. The documents were placed
in evidence before the trial court at the pretrials and
the court clearly and emphatically declared that the
same was not a loan and that such a defense, in the
light of all of the facts, was not valid. Factually, Hallstrom had no conversation of contact with Buhler
in the preliminary stages, and the only contact with
Buhler occurred after the Contract & Mortgage Exchange had made known to Hallstrom Buhler's offer
to sell the Buhler-Snyder contract at a discount. As
a matter of fact, the Contract & Mortgage Exchange
was a business set up, not for the loan of money as
a loaning agency (as it's charter will so show), but
rather it was an agency which brokered contracts
o.nd mortgages at a discount. This fact was known to
Buhler.
Respondent makes no negative contention that
the courts are reluctant to permit mere form to prevail over substance as set out in the discussion in
154 A. L. R. 1063, but we fail to see the significance
o£ defendant-appellant's statement that in the sale
of a piece of property it is assumed that the buyer
runs the risks incident to the ownership of the property purchased. Counsel cites the case of Britz vs.
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Kinswater (1960), 87 Ariz. 385, 351 P. 2d 986, and
three other cases supporting the test of what consti·tutes a loan. These cases are totally out of point with
the matter here under consideration. In all of these
cases the situation was such that the seller would
receive money from the buyer, but that when the
buyer had been satisfied and had received a designated amount of money from the seller, that he
would return the contract to the seller. In other
words, the buyer was merely holding the contract
as a security for an obligation and in some cases attempting to circumvent the law of usury. The test
used in these cases to construe the transactions as
a loan rather than a sale was the fact that the seller
was to receive the contract back, and that buyer was
to receive his money in any event, with little or no
risk, and further that buyer was unfamiliar
with the property. Such a situation was not true in
the present case. Mr. Hallstrom purchased the contract from Mr. Buhler without recourse and without
agreement that it would be returned. He bought it
with no strings attached. Buhler had no option to
receive it back. Hallstrom had no obligation or
privilege of giving the contract back for any designated amount of money. Hallstrom very carefully
checked the property and walked over the same
personally, as well as discussed the matter with
Snyder and his wife. After so doing, Hallstrom felt
two things, (1) that Snyder was not a good risk so
far as paying the contract balance, and (2) that the
property as such was not a good risk for a purchase,
even at a discount, so Hallstrom insisted that if he
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bought the contract he be given some sort of a
guaranty that the contract balance would be paid
'off. The guaranty given by Buhler took the form of
a mortgage on Buhler's home in Salt Lake City.
Moreover, the cases defining a loan are practically in full accord that
" . . . lending ,or loaning money or credit is at once
understood to mean a transaction creating the customary relation of borrower and lender, in which
the money is borrowed for a fixed time and the borrower promises to repay the amount borrowed at a
stated time in the future with interest at a fixed
rate." (Bannock County, et al vs. Citizens Bank &
Trust Co., et al, 53 Ida. 159, 22 P. 2d 674)
"A loan of money has been defined as a contract by
which one delivers a sum of money to another and
the latte,r agrees to return at a future time a sum
equivalent to that which he borrows." (54 C. J. S.
654)

The crux is the promise to pay back the amount borrowed. In the instant case there was no promise by
Buhler to pay back the money paid him by Hallstrom, nor was there evidence or any other indicia
of a loan.
Hallstrom was to receive the contract face value
of $19,938,86, plus interest, which was the value of
the real estate contract for the sale of the farm in
Idaho. He was to receive the whole amount of that
contract balance, but was not, nor did his pleadings
indicate he was entitled to receive that amount pertaining to the personal property which involved a
contractual obligation between Snyder and Buhler
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for personal property and chattels upon the farm.
Appellant would confuse the facts in an attempt to
show that Hallstrom was only getting a portion of
the contract and not all of it, and therefore was taking the same as a security for a loan. This simply is
not true.

POINT II
APPELLANT'S MORTGAGE WAS SECURITY FOR A
GUARANTY, WHICH GUARANTY WAS ABSOLUTE AND NOT CONDITIONAL.

Appellant Buhler claims that no notice was given of the breach of the principal contract and that
Hallstrom failed to fix his loss against the principal
and, therefore, did not comply with conditions precedent to recovery aqainst Buhler.
Here, appellant is assuming that the guaranty
herein given was a conditional guaranty, which is
not so. The guaranty herein given was an absolute
guaranty, and under the law of absolute guaranty
the guarantee is not required to give notice (although notice was given in this case) to the guarantor o£ the default of the principal. See 38 C. J. S. at
page 1223, Section 63:
"In general, in the absence of an express provision,
the duty of the guarantee to notify the guarantor of
a default depends upon whether or not the guaranty
is absolute, the guarantor being usually held entitled to notice only when the guaranty is conditional or uncertain as to amount and accrual."

The case on guaranty cited by the appellants,
Wall vs. Eccles (1922), 61 U 247, 211 Pac. 702, clearly
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and definitely defines what is an absolute guaranty
and what is a conditional guaranty, and the duties
·and obligations of both. Wall vs. Eccles sets out that
an absolute guaranty is one by which the guarantor
unconditionally promises payment or performance
of the principal contract on default of the principal
debtor or obligor, while a conditional guaranty is
one which is not enforceable immediately upon the
default of the principal but under which some contingency must happen or the guarantee must take
some steps to fix the liability of the guarantor. It
further holds that if the guaranty is absolute it is
not necessary to exhaust the remedies against the
principal debtor before proceeding against the
guarantor.
The case of Wall vs. Eccles held the guaranty
therein to be absolute and involved the purchase of
certain mining equipment and turns on a letter written by Eccles to Col. E. A. Wall in which he sets out
the terms and conditions and says, further:
"For your information will state that I will personally guarantee this bill." (P. 253)

(See also Brown vso Merriott, 97 U. 65, 89 P. 2d 478.)
In the instant case, as in the Wall vs. Eccles case,
there were no conditions precedent nor was the
guaranty conditioned upon any contingency whatsoever, other_ than failure of Snyder to make the
payments.
Appellant suggests that the mortgage involved
is ambiguous. He 9-dmit$ that it guarantees the paySponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ments due to be made by Snyder, but then states
that the mortgage does not specify whether Hallstrom is to be protected before pursuing his remedie$
under the assignment or after. As a matter of fact,
it specifically states as follows (R. 5):
"This mort,gage is ·given to secure the performance
by the purchaser of .the terms and conditions of a
certain contract dated September 16, 1958, by and
between L. M. Buhler and Monica Buhler, sellers
therein, and William Snyder and Irene Louise
Snyder, buyers therein, covering ... which said contract is, concurrently with the execution hereof, being assigned by said L. M. Buhler and Monica Buhler, his wife, to the above named mortgagees (Allen
Hallstrom and Johanna C. Hallstrom, his wife). The
purpose of this mortgage is to ,guarantee to the
above named mortgagees the payment by William
Snyder and Irene Louise· Snyder of the sums that
will be due and payable to the above named mortgagees under the said contract and assignment."

We submit that we know of no way that this
mortage could have been more specific. It is in no
way ambiguous, and its specifies that Buhler guarantees Snyder's payments. As such, the mortgage is
not ambiguous and Hallstrom is not required to
pursue any remedies other than foreclosure of the
mortgage, since that is the only remedy required of
him under the assignment and mortgage guaranty.
Since the law of conditional guaranty is not involved, it is not necessary that such guaranty or
mortgage specify whether or not Hallstrom is protected before or after, or that he do any act precedent
to foreclosure.
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POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY ENTERED SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR PLAINTIFFS.

The trial court correctly entered summary judgment in favor of Hallstrom and against Buhler after
fully considering the pleadings, facts, and evidence.
On three separate occasions the appellant Buhler
submitted to the trial court evidence and arguments
in favor of his position and even attempted to vary
the terms of the transaction by parol evidence.
Buhler argued that the assignment and mortgage
were ambiguous and offered extrinsic evidence in
support thereof. Although the court was not bound
to do so, the court received this parol evidence and
considered it in framing its Findings, Conclusions
and Decree, even though at no place in appellant's
pleadings or evidence did he suggest that the transaction was fraudulent, misrepresented or the result
of a mistake.
Buhler, in his brief, again attempts to vary the
terms and c6nditions of the mortgage and assignment by extrinsic and parol evidence to say that
the mortgage was given to secure a loan, notwithstanding the fact that the mortgage cites on its face
that the mortgage was given to secure Snyder's payments under the contract. The general rule with respect to use of parol evidence is stated in 36 Am.
Jur. 749, Mortgages, Section 124, as follows:
"Extrinsic evidence to aid in the interpretation of a
mortgage is admissable where the instrument is ambiguous and succeptible of different constructions.
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It is, however, admissable only in such cases. The
rule may not be applied and parol evidence is not
competent for the purpose of varying a written contract expressed in a mortgage, deed of trust in the
nature of a mortgage, or note secured thereby, by
showing any understanding prior to, or at the· time
of, its execution, in the absence of fraud, mis.representation, or mistake."

Absent Buhler's allegations of fraud, misrepresentation or mistake, there existed no genuine issue of
fact. The only issue which could be raised is whether
or not the Snyders had performed fully the BuhlerSnyder contract which had been purchased, by respondent (R. 23). However, this is not an issue since
the appellant admits in the affidavit of L. M. Buhler
that the Snyders defaulted by failing to make the
payments and that they abandoned the property
(R. 21). Appellant was duly notified of Snyder's default (R. 21, 34, 35-36). Appellant failed to pay, whereupon Hallstrom commenced action to foreclose the
Buhler-Hallstrom mortgage.
The transactions are simple-( l) Buhler assigned
the Buhler-Snyder contract to Hallstr0m and guaranteed Snyder's payments. (2) As security for the
guaranty, Buhler gave Hallstrom a mortgage on
Buhler's home in Oak Hills. The trial court studied
the documents, the affidavit of Buhler, heard appellant's arguments at both pretrials, and at a third
hearing, and considered the parol evidence offered
by Buhler in support of his position, yet the trial
court was convinced that there was no loan involved
and regarded the mortgage as security for the
guaranty (R. 72, 80).
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The summary judgment granted by the District
Court in favor of~ respondent should be upheld by
this court for the reason that adequate proof was offered by respondent in support of the motion for
summary judgment and there exists no genuine issue of fact. As was stated by this Court in Dupler vs.
Yates, 10 U. 2d 251, 351 P. 2d 624, 636:
"Certainly, if the· summary judgment procedure iS"
to be effective, it must be held that when adequate
proof is submitted in support of the motion, the
pleadings are riot sufficient to raise an issue of
fact."

POINT IV
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
DECREE ENTERED BY TRIAL COURT ARE SUPPORTED BY PLEADINGS AND PROOF, AND
SHOULD STAND AS VALID.

With respect to appellant's contention in Point
III of appellant's brief that the judgment of the trial
court was $2,847.48 plus interest in excess of that
pleaded or proved, the trial court determined at both
pretrial conferences that respondent was entitled to
certain specific amounts, and judgment was granted
accordingly. Respondent did plead in his complaint
for the recovery of the principal amount owing on
the Buhler-Hallstrom mortgage ($17,938.36), plus interest ($896.94), costs and $1500.00 attorney's fees.
Although respondent did not specifically plead the
amount of $967.50 plus interest paid by respondent
to John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company, or
the amount o~ $302.02 plus interest paid by respond-
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ent for taxes, or the amount of $1,180.00 plus interest
paid by Hallstrom to Teeples, respondent did plead
generally that the court determine the amount owing
by appellant to respondent and for judgment thereon and for such other and further relief in the
premises as plaintiffs are entitled to and the court
deems just and proper ... (R. 3-4). At the hearing
on appellant's motion for supplemental pretrial order (R. 45), appellant introduced into evidence the
affidavit of the defendant L. M. Buhler wherein Buhler admitted that Hallstrom had paid Teeples $1,180.00, $967.50 to John Hancock Insurance Company and $302.02 on property taxes (R. 21.) The
court considered this affidavit in denying appellant's motion and in turn granting judgment against
Buhler for those amounts paid by respondent, which
the appellant admitted had been paid (R. 75-76, 8081).
II

II

Respondent submits that the appellant cannot
object to the Findings, Conclusions and Decree on
those amounts on the basis that they constitute a
material variance from the original pleading. Respondent submits that the Findings, Conclusions and
Decree do conform to the pleadings· and proof adduced at the pretrial conferences. That they conform
to the pleadings is apparent in that respondent
asked the court for judgment in those amounts the
court determined were owing, and for such other
and further relief as the respondent was entitled
to and was just and proper. That they conform to
the proof is obvious from the appellant's sworn affidavit which was submitted into evidence by the
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appellant himself. Moreover, the law does not require that recovery of every dollar sought be specifically pleaded.
Respondent submits that those amounts which
were not specifically pleaded were nonetheless
:Put' ·in issue by the appellant at the second pretrial
conference by the introduction of his affidavit and
were considered by the court to be in issue by the
implied -consent of the appellant.
Rule 54(c) (l) U. R. C. P. states that " ... every
final judgment shall grant the relief to which the
party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even
if .the party has not demanded such relief in his
pleadings."
Although respondent did not demand specifically relief on the $1,180.00, $967.50 and $302.02 plus
interest in his pleadings, nor did respondent amend
his pleadings at the time of the pretrial conference
to demand specifically those amounts, the appellant
·was in no way prejudiced thereby, nor was appellant surprised and misled, and the validity of the
Findings, Conclusions and Decree, in granting the
respondent those amounts are in no way affected.
Rule l5(b) U. R. C. P. states:
"When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by
express or implied consent of the parties, they shall
be treated· in all respects as if they had been raised
in the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings·.
as may be necessary to cause them to conform to
the. evidence and to raise these issues may be made
upon motion of any party at any time, even after
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judgment; that iailure so to amend does not affect
the result of the trial of these issues.'' (Emphasis
added.)

In construing this section, the Supreme Court
in the case of Seamo·ns vs. Andersen, 122 U. 497, 252
J. 2d 209, affirmed a money judgment for an amount
not specifically pleaded.
The case involved a prayer for relief by one
Peterson, a party defendant who cross-claimed
against the defendant Andersen, and included a
prayer against Andersen and various other defendants for specific sums of money, and " ... for
such further relief as the equities of this cause is
justified." The record revealed that defendant Andersen had agreed to pay an additional $117.00 to
Peterson, Judgment was given to Peterson and Andersen appealed contending error on the part of
the trial court in granting judgment against Andersen for the $117.00 when it was not specifically
prayed for by the cross-claiming Peterson. The Supreme Court upheld the ruling of the trial court
stating that in view of the record and in view of
U. R. C. P. lS(b), failure to rully amend the pleading
was non-prejudicial to the defendant Andersen. See
also Buehner Block Co. vs. Glezo.s, 6 U. 2d 226, 310
P. 2d 517.
That the judgment of court as contended by
Buhler was $2,847.48, plus interest, in excess of
pleadings and proof is erroneous. As a matter of
fact, the amounts prayed for, together with interest
thereon, plus the amounts admitted by Buhler in his
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affidavit/ plus interest (R. 20) total in excess of the
amount for which judgment was actually given.
1

CONCLUSION
The respondent respectfully submits that the
summary judgment rendered by the District Court
be sustained on the basis and for the reason that
there exists in this case no genuine issue of fact.
Respondent contends that the list of issues proposed
by appellant in the conclusion of his brief were put
before the trial court at the retrial conferences and
subsequent hearing/ and were resolved in favor of
respondent. In so doing/ the District Court relied
upon the pleadings and evidence then before it and
the arguments of counseL and concluded that appellant had raised no genuine issue of fact which
should be tried.
Respondent submits that the summary judgment was correct in law and in fact and requests
that it be affirmed by this Court.
Respectfully submitted,
JED W. SHIELDS
WARREN M. WEGGELAND
Attorneys for
Plaintiffs-Respondents
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